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Abstract: 
 
The puzzle for dividend policy in Indonesia is still remain since the firms have uncertain 
distribution for dividends to their shareholders. The objectives of this study are testing the 
free cash flow theory, life cycle theory, and catering theory with 139 firms as samples which 
is listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange for period of 2010 to 2015.  
 
This study finds that, firms in Indonesia are not at mature level and there is an existence for 
free cash flow effect on dividend payers with lower debt only, while catering effect is 
generally exist for firms as dividend payers. Furthermore, since the firms as non dividend 
payers are on growth level then they are generally use their profit and capital gain includes 
debts in purposes of investment activities. 
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Introduction 
 
Dividend policy is remain a puzzle after years since sounded by Black (1996). 
According to Black (1996), understanding the motives by firms and shareholders are 
important to do in terms to view the issues behind dividend policy. Black (1996) 
clarifies that, it is difficult to determine whether shareholders are demanding 
dividends or not, but if the attention by shareholders are dividends then firms shall 
not eliminate dividends.  
 
The puzzle seems occur for dividend policy in Indonesia, since the firms have paid 
fluctuate amount for yearly dividends and the others have not paid yearly dividends 
as informed by Budiarso and Pontoh (2016). The puzzle seems more complex while 
the firms in Indonesia have varies shareholders as informed by Saerang and Pontoh 
(2016) who classifying the ownership for firms in Indonesia into two groups, which 
are : state and/or institutional ownership and individual and/or public ownership. 
This study observed, debts are the factor which makes these firms are varies in 
distributing their dividends since most of firms have large debt. 
 
Notice the works by Budiarso and Pontoh (2016) and Saerang and Pontoh (2016), 
then the study resolves the issues behind dividend policy in perspectives of three 
theories, which are free cash flow theory, life cycle theory, and catering theory. Free 
cash flow theory emphasizes that dividend policy arise because of conflict between 
shareholders and managers (Jensen, 1988; Kuan, Li, and Liu, 2012; Thalassinos and 
Liapis, 2014; Liapis et al., 2013). While life cycle theory emphasizes that firms are 
paying their dividends to shareholders because they are mature (Grullon, Michaely, 
and Swaminathan, 2002; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz, 2006). Another opinion 
proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b) is called catering theory, where this 
theory emphasizes that firms shall pay their dividends (cater) if only shareholders or 
investors overvalue their share price in market. 
 
The study proceeds as follows, section 2 reviews the relevant literatures and then 
develops the hypothesis, section 3 explains the research method includes describing 
the samples and variables, section 4 presents the result and discuss the findings, and 
section 5 concludes the findings. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Free cash flow theory  
 
Free cash flow theory is a theory which emphasizes that dividend policy arise by 
conflict of interests between shareholders and managers (Jensen, 1988; Kuan, Li, 
and Liu, 2012). According to Jensen (1988), Aivazian, Ge, and Qiu (2005), and 
Fairchild, Guney, and Thanatawee (2014), the symptom of conflict is started when 
firms have excess cash which evoke a collision about how to allocate the cash, 
whether need to distribute as dividends for shareholders or spend it for investments 
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which at the end the return of these investments shall give benefit for managers. The 
conflict is exist while shareholders prevent the managers for overinvest and demand 
for dividends (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Thalassinos et al., 2015a; 2015b). 
 
Following Jensen (1986), Myers (2001) explains that, the free cash flow theory is a 
theory that applicable especially for profitable firms or mature firms in condition of 
overinvest, where debt can be used by shareholders as a tool for controlling and 
disciplining the managers. In similar, Thakor and Wilson (1995), Neale, Milsom, 
Hills, and Sharples (1998), Aivazian, Ge, and Qiu (2005), Brav, Graham, Harvey, 
and Michaely (2005), Fairchild, Guney, and Thanatawee (2014), and Saerang and 
Pontoh (2016) are also suggest to obtain the debt in term to control the expenditures 
for investments activities by managers and distribute the profit as dividends to 
shareholders.  
 
2.2. Life cycle theory 
 
The basic concept for life cycle theory is the firms normally paying their dividends 
to shareholders because they are on peak stage in their life cycle or maturity 
(Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan, 2002). Furthermore, Grullon, Michaely, and 
Swaminathan (2002) confirm that, at mature stage, most of the firms are 
characterized by large of free cash flow while their capital expenditures are 
shrinking, which is consistence with Garengo, Nudurupati, and Bititci (2007) who 
give description that, at stage of maturity, most of firms are usually have good 
governance and better performance.  
 
The relationship with dividend policy, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) 
confirming that, the mature firms are have high tendencies to distribute their 
earnings in form of dividends to their shareholders because they have better 
profitability with small investment opportunities. Moreover, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, 
and Stulz (2006) emphasize that, mature firms often increase their dividends for their 
shareholders because these firms are supported by abundant portion of retained 
earnings, which is consistent with the findings by Fairchild, Guney, and Thanatawee 
(2014), Budiarso and Pontoh (2016) and Saerang and Pontoh (2016) who confirm 
that, mature firms are normally increase their dividends because they are much 
larger, more profitable, have higher cash flows and have higher retained earnings 
ratios, although Fairchild, Guney, and Thanatawee (2014) also pointing, higher debt 
generally decreases dividend payments. 
 
2.3. Catering theory 
 
The other explanation about phenomenon behind dividend policy is catering policy 
which first time proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b). According to 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b), the basic concept for this theory is firms or 
managers shall pay their dividends (cater) if only shareholders or investors are put 
higher price on their shares in the market. Moreover, Baker and Wurgler (2004a) 
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explain that, there are three main points for catering theory, which are : (1) 
psychological or institutional reasons; (2) uninformed investor; and (3) firms with 
rationally will cater for investor’s demand, or in the other words, rational 
distribution of dividends. 
 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b) confirm that, the catering theory emphasizes that 
investor’s psychological or sentiment will react under dividends announcement if 
they are uninformed, and this finding is consistent with Dreman and Lufkin (2000), 
Li and Zhao (2008), Polk and Sapienza (2009), Pontoh (2015) and Budiarso and 
Pontoh (2016). In addition, Li and Lie (2006) explain that, firms who not cater the 
shareholders or investors with dividends are generally penalized by decreasing share 
price in market. 
 
2.4. Hypothesis development 
 
2.4.1. Debt assets ratio 
 
Notice the works by Jensen (1986), Thakor and Wilson (1995), Neale, Milsom, 
Hills, and Sharples (1998), Myers (2001), Aivazian, Ge, and Qiu (2005), Brav, 
Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005), Fairchild, Guney, and Thanatawee (2014), 
Thalassinos et al. (2012; 2015a, 2015b) and Saerang and Pontoh (2016) this study 
suspects, if shareholders are using debt as tool in term to control the investment 
activities by managers includes disciplining them then free cash flow theory is exist, 
where debt has positive significant effect to dividend policy. 
 
Ha1 : Debt assets ratio has positive significant effect to dividend. 
 
2.4.2. Ratio of retained earnings to total assets 
 
Notice the works by Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002), DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006), Fairchild, Guney, and Thanatawee (2014), Budiarso 
and Pontoh (2016) and Saerang and Pontoh (2016) this study suspects, if the firms 
are on level of maturity then they have large retained earnings, which means they 
shall able to pay dividends to their shareholders make retained earnings has positive 
significant effect to dividend policy. 
 
Ha2 : Retained earnings to total assets ratio has positive significant effect to 
dividend. 
 
2.4.3. Share price 
 
Notice the works by Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b), Dreman and Lufkin (2000), 
Li and Zhao (2008), Polk and Sapienza (2009), Pontoh (2015) and Budiarso and 
Pontoh (2016) this study suspects, if share price is triggering the firms to pay their 
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dividends then catering theory is exist, where share price has positive significant 
effect to dividend policy. 
 
Ha3 : Share price has positive significant effect to dividend. 
 
2.4.4. Return on assets 
 
Free cash flow effect generally exist for mature firms or profitable firms (Myers, 
2001) as confirmed by DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006), Jordan, Liu, and Wu 
(2014), Budiarso and Pontoh (2016) and Saerang and Pontoh (2016), makes this 
study suspects that, if profit is the most determinant factor for distribution of 
dividends then both for free cash flow and life cycle theories, profit has positive 
significant effect to dividend policy. 
 
Ha4 : Return on assets has positive significant effect to dividend. 
 
2.4.5. Tangibility 
 
Notice the works by Jensen (1986), Thakor and Wilson (1995), Neale, Milsom, 
Hills, and Sharples (1998), Myers (2001), Aivazian, Ge, and Qiu (2005), Brav, 
Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005), Fairchild, Guney, and Thanatawee (2014), 
and Saerang and Pontoh (2016) then in condition where the free cash flow and life 
cycle theories can be applied, firms shall use debt in order for financing additional 
fixed assets. The profit gained by those assets then can be used for paying debt and 
its interest and also distributes as dividends. 
 
Ha5 : Tangibility has positive significant effect to dividend. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
 
3.1. Sample 
 
This study uses 139 firms as samples which is listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(www.idx.co.id) for period of 2010 to 2015 as defines in Table 1. As the samples, 
the firms should published their audited financial report and  have the information 
needed by this study in observed period. This study excluding the finance sector and 
property, real estate, and building construction sector since they have different 
financial report structure. 
 
Table 1. Samples 
 
Sectors Samples Observed 
Agriculture 9 54 
Mining 14 84 
Basic Industry & Chemicals 31 186 
Miscellaneous Industry 18 108 
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Consumer Goods Industry 16 96 
Infrastructure, Utilities, and Transportation 12 72 
Trade, Service, Investment 39 234 
Total 139 834 
 
3.2. Variable definitions 
 
Table 2 defines the dependent variable and independent variables for this study. The 
dependent variable for this study is dividend policy measured by dummy with codes 
as follow : 1 for firms who pay dividend at least more or equal than average Rp. 1 in 
observed period (called as dividend payers) and 0 for firms who not pay dividend in 
observed period (called as non dividend payers). Furthermore, this study is following 
the cut off by Weijermars (2012) and Bonaimé, Öztekin and Warr (2014) to classify 
the debt ratio based on its average for each firms into higher or lower debt, where 
firms who have over 50% debt ratio can be called firms with higher debt or vice 
versa. In addition, this study is normalized all independent variables by natural 
logarithms since they have different unit measurements. 
 
Table 2. Variable Definitions 
Variables Measurement 
Dividend (DIV) Dummy 
Debt assets ratio (DAR) Ratio of total debt to total assets 
Retained earnings ratio 
(RETA) 
Ratio of retained earnings to total assets 
Price (PRICE) Closing share price at the end of year after corporate 
action 
Return on assets (ROA) Ratio of net profit to total assets 
Tangibility (TANG) Ratio of total fixed assets to total assets 
 
3.3. Regression model 
 
The hypotheses testing for this study is conducting logistic regression analysis at 
significance 5% with equation model as follows : 
DIVdummy = α + β1DAR + β2RETA + β3PRICE + β4ROA + β5TANG + ε 
 
This study also uses the chi square value in term to determine whether the model is 
fit or model is not fit at significance 5%. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the samples of this study. In category of 
firms with lower debt, the dividend payers have higher ratio of total debt to total 
assets, share prices, and ratio of net profit to total assets rather than non dividend 
payers except for ratio of total fixed assets to total assets, which giving presumptions 
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the possibilities for existence of free cash flow effect and catering effect. Moreover, 
the higher ratio of retained earnings to total assets by dividend payers assumes that, 
these firms are more mature rather than firms as non dividend payers. 
 
The category of firms with higher debt shows that, the dividend payers have higher 
share prices and ratio of net profit to total assets rather than non dividend payers 
which giving presumptions the possibilities for existence of catering effect on these 
firms. Also, the higher ratio of retained earnings to total assets by firms as dividend 
payers indicates these firms are more mature than firms as non dividend payers.  
 
The firms as non dividend payers have higher ratio of total debt to total assets and 
ratio of total fixed assets to total assets than firms as dividend payers which giving 
presumptions these firms are obtaining debts in term for investment activities or 
otherwise, the existence of free cash flow effect.  
 
This study also reports that, the ratio of total fixed assets to total assets for non 
dividend payers both with lower or higher debt are similar which means these firms 
are emphasize on investment activities includes confirms the results for debt, share 
prices, and profitability. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Dividend payers with lower debt (N = 330)    
DAR 0.04 0.98 0.33 
RETA -2.22 1.33 0.41 
PRICE 0.00 132500.00 6624.92 
ROA -0.14 0.75 0.12 
TANG 0.02 0.91 0.28 
    
Non dividend payers with lower debt (N = 144)    
DAR 0.00 0.82 0.30 
RETA -3.31 0.88 -0.12 
PRICE 50.00 18050.00 1411.51 
ROA -0.62 0.37 0.01 
TANG 0.00 0.96 0.43 
    
Dividend payers with higher debt (N = 222)    
DAR 0.35 2.12 0.67 
RETA -0.17 1.10 0.17 
PRICE 63.00 37000.00 2827.46 
ROA -0.16 0.72 0.05 
TANG 0.00 0.99 0.34 
    
Non dividend payers with higher debt (N = 138)    
DAR 0.06 5.03 0.85 
RETA -26.74 1.80 -0.76 
PRICE 35.00 2000.00 412.66 
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ROA -1.28 3.47 0.01 
TANG 0.00 0.88 0.38 
 
4.2. Firms in general condition 
 
The model for general condition means this study is running the regression without 
controlling the debt ratio. Table 4 shows that all chi square are insignificant at 5% 
which means all the models are fit for both of dividend payers and non dividend 
payers. In this condition, debt assets ratio (Ha1), share price (Ha3), and return on 
assets (Ha4) have positive significant effect to dividend policy, which means free 
cash flow effect and catering effect are exists on firms as dividend payers. 
Otherwise, on firms as non dividend payers these variables have negative significant 
effect to dividend policy. The earnings to total assets ratio (Ha2) and tangibility (Ha5) 
are insignificant to dividend policy, which means that, in general condition dividend 
payers and non dividend payers are not firms at mature level. 
 
4.3. Firms with lower debt 
 
Table 4 shows that all chi square are insignificant at 5% which means all the models 
are fit for both of dividend payers and non dividend payers. Table 4 also shows that, 
for dividend payers, debt assets ratio (Ha1), share price (Ha3), and return on assets 
(Ha4) have positive significant effect to dividend policy as predicted by hypotheses 
of this study, while for non dividend payers, these variables have negative 
significant effect to dividend policy. The earnings to total assets ratio (Ha2) and 
tangibility (Ha5) are insignificant to dividend policy, which is giving an implication 
that, dividend payers and non dividend payers are not firms at mature level in 
context of life cycle theory. These results are confirming the results for firms in 
general condition. 
 
Consistent with Jensen (1986), Thakor and Wilson (1995), Neale, Milsom, Hills, and 
Sharples (1998), Myers (2001), Aivazian, Ge, and Qiu (2005), Brav, Graham, 
Harvey, and Michaely (2005), Fairchild, Guney, and Thanatawee (2014), and 
Saerang and Pontoh (2016), the result shows that, debts are playing its role in term to 
control the activities by managers, which indicates the existence of free cash flow 
effect for firms as dividend payers. Otherwise, the existence of debts for non 
dividend payers are not caused by free cash flow effect because the result shows 
that, increasing in debts makes these firms are decreasing their dividends to their 
shareholders, which indicates debts shall create inability to pay dividends since these 
firms are bearing the interest expenses which reducing their profit. 
 
Consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b), Dreman and Lufkin (2000), Li 
and Zhao (2008), Polk and Sapienza (2009), Pontoh (2015) and Budiarso and Pontoh 
(2016), the positive effect by share price shows that the catering effect is exist for 
firms as dividend payers but not for firms as non dividend payers. The negative 
effect by share prices for firms as non dividend payers indicates these firms are 
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retained their capital gain for other intentions which are most possibly for financing 
their projects.  
 
The positive effect by return on assets for firms as dividend payers is consistent with 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006), Jordan, Liu, and Wu (2014), Budiarso and 
Pontoh (2016) and Saerang and Pontoh (2016) which implies that, profitability is a 
factor to support their decision for debt policy in term to avoid the free cash flow 
effect includes triggering the sentiment from investors through a good news about 
their profit which shall create the catering effect. Whereas the negative effect by 
return on assets for firms as non dividend payers is supporting the indications on 
results of debt policy and share price, where these firms tend to keep some portion of 
earnings with purposes for investments. 
 
Table 4. Logistic Regression for Dividend Policy  
 Dividend Payers  Non Dividend Payers 
Dependent Variable Dividend (dummy)  Dividend (dummy) 
Firms in general condition (N=834)    
Constant -2.983  2.983 
DAR 0.457*  -0.457* 
RETA 0.037  -0.037 
PRICE 0.847*  -0.847* 
ROA 0.404*  -0.404* 
TANG 0.010  -0.010 
Chi-square :  0.146 (fit model)  0.202 (fit model) 
    
Firms with lower debt (N=474)    
Constant 0.209  -0.209 
DAR 1.008*  -1.008* 
RETA 0.229  -0.229 
PRICE 0.652*  -0.652* 
ROA 0.772*  -0.772* 
TANG -0.124  0.124 
Chi-square :  0.073 (fit model)  0.118 (fit model) 
    
Firms with higher debt (N=360)    
Constant -4.912  4.912 
DAR -0.504  0.504 
RETA 0.133  -0.133 
PRICE 1.016*  -1.016* 
ROA 0.251*  -0.251* 
TANG -0.060  0.060 
Chi-square significance :  0.271 (fit model)  0.271 (fit model) 
*significant at 5%    
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4.4. Firms with higher debt 
 
Table 4 shows that all chi square are insignificant at 5% which means all the models 
are fit for both of dividend payers and non dividend payers. Table 4 also shows that, 
for dividend payers, share price (Ha3) and return on assets (Ha4) have positive 
significant effect to dividend policy as predicted by hypotheses of this study, while 
for non dividend payers, these variables have negative significant effect to dividend 
policy. The debt assets ratio (Ha1), earnings to total assets ratio (Ha2) and tangibility 
(Ha5) are insignificant to dividend policy, which is giving an implication that, 
dividend payers and non dividend payers are not in conflict of interests between 
shareholders and managers in context of free cash flow theory and also not firms at 
mature level in context of life cycle theory. 
 
Similar to firms as dividend payers with lower debt, the positive effect by share price 
shows that the catering effect is exist for firms as dividend payers with higher debt 
which is consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b), Dreman and Lufkin 
(2000), Li and Zhao (2008), Polk and Sapienza (2009), Pontoh (2015) and Budiarso 
and Pontoh (2016). Also, similar to firms as non dividend payers with lower debt, 
the negative effect by share prices for non dividend payers with higher debt indicates 
these firms have same intentions especially for investment activities. 
 
Similar to firms as dividend payers with lower debt, the positive effect by return on 
assets for firms as dividend payers with higher debt is consistent with DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006), Jordan, Liu, and Wu (2014), Budiarso and Pontoh 
(2016) and Saerang and Pontoh (2016) which implies that, profitability also is a 
factor to trigger the sentiment from investors through a good news which shall create 
the catering effect. This result also confirms the insignificant effect by debt ratio 
which means, profitability is not a factor to support their debt policy. Whereas the 
negative effect by return on assets implies same purposes between firms as non 
dividend payers with lower and higher debt. 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
The motives by firms behind dividend policy can be seen in perspectives of free cash 
flow theory, life cycle theory, and catering theory. This study extents the testing for 
these theories in term to reveal the motives behind dividend policy by conducting 
logistic regression analysis with controlling the variable for debt and uses 139 firms 
as samples which is listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange for period of 2010 to 2015. 
 
This study reports that, both of dividend payers and non dividend payers with lower 
debt are not firms at mature level. Supported by profitability, the free cash flow 
effect and catering effect are exists for dividend payers with lower debt. While firms 
as non dividend payers with lower debt, in purposes for investments then these firms 
are not paying their dividends because they are bearing the debt interest expenses 
and retained their capital gain. 
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Furthermore, this study reports that, both of dividend payers and non dividend 
payers with higher debt are also not at mature level and also do not have conflict of 
interests between shareholders and managers. Similar to firms as dividend payers 
with lower debt, the catering effect is exist for firms as dividend payers with higher 
debt, while there is similar behavior in treating capital gain between non dividend 
payers with lower debt and non dividend payers with higher debt. 
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